

**INTERNATIONAL AID AND GOVERNANCE: AN ANALYSIS ON UZBEK MAHALLA ORGANISATION\*****Professor Dr. Haluk ALKAN**

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Kahramanmaraş/Turkey**ABSTRACT**

This study is an analysis of international aid and governance, using the Uzbek mahalla organization as a case. The study stresses that the strong local authorities developed by state may establish a system of monitoring and inspection for both international aid and the institutions organize it.

In this study first of all, the traditional role of Uzbek Mahalla organization and their establishment during the Soviet period is discussed, then its legal and functional role after the independence of Uzbekistan is searched. Finally, the role of Uzbek mahalla organization in terms of distribution of international aid is analysed.

The study is concluded by pointing out that Uzbekistan constitutes a good example of how a state faces problems in terms of collaboration with non-governmental organizations for governance and the distribution of international aid, that the non-governmental organizations do not play an important role where they are not supported well by state, and therefore they can only play a role of social observer, like the Uzbek mahalla organizations.

**Key Words:** International aid, Governance, Mahalla, Uzbekistan

**1. INTRODUCTION**

International aid has existed as a concept which ranges from the establishment of public services in the developing countries to effective use of the public services such as resources, education and expertise. With this respect, international aid acts as an indispensable resource. However, the occurrence and organization of the international aid is not a concept which bothers the helper and the receiver anymore. Even in the countries which faced big disasters, in the process of the distribution of the aid fairly faces big problems because of the bureaucratic obstacles or local corruptions. Similar obstacles can be observed in the international aid which contains structural reforms. The recommended solution to this problem is the use of local non-governmental organizations in the organizing, distribution, planning and application processes. But is it enough? Can the local entities that we define as functional, really become an efficient governance subject? Can this solution become a de facto way in every situation? Some of the former researches (Tandon, 1996; Bayliss, 1995), focused on not a weak non-governmental social structural relationship, but a one-way strict auditing network relationship. But in this study it is asserted that, governmentally designed strong local authorities can construct an auditing system which both detects international aid and the organizations which organize it. The subject is investigated in the Uzbekistan mahalla organization context. Initially,

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the traditional role of the Uzbek Mahalla Organization and how it is constructed in the Soviet period are discussed and then, the legal and functional roles that are given to the organization after the independence of Uzbekistan are tackled. Also, the role of Uzbek Mahalla organization in the distribution of the international aid and its consequences are covered.

## **2. UZBEK MAHALLA IN THE CLASSICAL AGE**

Uzbek Mahallaorganisation has got a very old history. Many resources take back the establishment of the mahalla to the 12th century(Micklewright and Marnie, 2005: 3). In its initial form, the mahalla was a construct which is based on the public experiences and religious traditions and consists of nearly a hundred people. The leading places of the mahalla were the mosque, teahouses in which people may come together, bazaar and the other sub-places that are constructed suitably to the region (Human Rights Watch, 2003: 5). The historical Silk Road has an important role on the establishment of this construct. Many big city centers are established in Middle Asia because of the trade. For instance, Samarkand.Hence, mahalla expresses a life style as a consequence of city life till the beginning. Again with a glance to Samarkand, in the 12th century, 2000 settlements are reported which can distribute free water directly to the city independently.Moreover the dynamics of this construct take back to a very old history. In the 7th century when the Islamic Armies arrived the area, they met a promoting and hospitable culture which is organized and taxed by the villagers.These forces effected the Islamic traditional institutions (Seiple, 2005: 248).

The Mongol Raids, lead by Genghis Han in 1220s caused harm in the mahalla just as it caused in everything. The revival could only be started at least a century afterwards; in the time of Timur (Seiple, 2005: 248). The trade again led the empowerment of personal property. By the 16th century, parallel to this development, charities became integrated in the mahalla system. The construction of the watering systems and some other locally financed activities are held by the charities. This is followed by the defense of the mahalla to the foreign attacks. Again, in time, mahallas distinguished from each other according expertise and ethnic roots. In this respect mahalla became an independent multi-cultural entity that carries out the financing of economic activities, marriage and catering, support to the public activities such as health care and defense (Sievers, 2002: 108).

## **3. THE EFFECTS OF SOVIET PERIOD**

Uzbekistan was in the domination of Russian Czarism by the second half of the 19th century. Russia didn't make a structural effect on mahallaorganizations because of the regional unclearness. The real change occurred with The Soviet regime. At the beginning Soviet regime tried to end the mahallaorganizations. However, the risk to face with resistance caused to end this initiative. Instead, Soviet regime decided to change the Uzbek mahalla as a tool for the new system. Mahalla was aimed to be used as a tool for the society to internalize communism by absorbing it to the party and government (Human Rights Watch, 2003: 5). Primarily, it was necessary to eliminate the organizations in the Soviet internationalism or restructure them with new meanings. For example, the mosque, traditional courts, charity system and cooperation related to the personal property are eliminated. The process continued till 1928. Many private institutions such as educational ones are tied up to the state. But the Soviet system didn't eliminate the mahallaorganization totally. The new administration maintained the mahalla under the name of Īskan (Settlement) organizations. Similar to the former situation, the leaders of these constructs are elected by the citizens. But the whole election process was in control of the Party. The former independent status of the elected people transformed to a local extension of the government. New branches such as women committees are constructed. The leaders of the mahalla were selected from the experienced party administrators (Siever, 2002: 113). The status of mahalla in Soviet system was firstly recognized as the supportive organ of the City Soviet. The leaders, deputy of the leader and the secretary of these organizations are selected by the citizens with the guidance of the local Soviet which consists of 3 to 5 people. With an arrangement made in 1941, mahalla committees were charged with the duty of preparing the lists

of the people that will compulsorily work in factories and collective farms. In 1953 and 1961 mahalla committees are decided to be established not only in the cities but also in the rural areas and the number of the members of the committees are increased. In 1983 a similar extension is done.

In this perspective, the mahalla organizations went between in performing such voluntary-mandatory public services. At the same time, they helped the police and intelligence agencies in collecting information about the residents (Masaru, 347-350). Mahalla was more than a tool for pressure but helped some citizens to perform some action voluntarily.

In brief, Soviet experience had a two way effect on mahalla. The Soviets enabled the existence of social interdependence in their period by not eliminating the mahalla. With Seiple's words mahallas were Soviet in structure but cultural in function:

“The imposition of these Soviet trappings of nationhood began a process whereby Uzbekistan, a country of shared Muslim values, would become a self-realized nation based on preexisting cultural elements. These cultural structures-community-based and linked through bonds of kinship, geography, and mutual patronage- simply adapted themselves to this latest empire. Over time, the Uzbeks rewrote Stalin's slogan, creating an Uzbek-Soviet civil society that was simultaneously Soviet in structure, but cultural in content.” (Seiple, 2005: 250).

On the other hand, mahalla transformed to an entity in which the central government can direct the social life and mobilize voluntarily and a way of collecting continuous information about the local area. In this context, mahalla served as not a very strict control tool. This twin construct was decisive in the restructuring of the mahalla after independence. At the same time, this dilemma will be the main dynamic of the discussion of the relationship of foreign aid and governance.

#### **4. MAHALLA ORGANIZATION AFTER INDEPENDENCE**

After the independence Mahalla is restructured as a more supportive entity to the central government. The political parties in the country with Kerimov's wish are constructed as entities representing different social parts. Mahalla organization gained new functions in such a corporatist-presidency regime. Uzbek administration has received the semi-legal structure of the mahalla from Soviet period and maintained it by empowering the functions related to the central government (Abramson, 1999). With this respect, mahalla has a very important role in the system. The importance that is dedicated to the mahalla is perceived as a democratic local administration application. But in Uzbekistan context mahalla is the spy of the central administration. So, this makes Uzbek mahalla an important part of the political system. Thus, it is important to note the functions of the mahalla in the system.

In the time of Kerimov, mahalla is redefined as the basic entity of the society. In Kerimov's words, the main characteristic of the Uzbek society is its rise on the collectivist ideas. ....(Except the mahallas) Today there is no entity which provides accurate information about the local families, their emotional and economical status. Mahallas are the most reliable and honest institutions for social support and at the same time these mechanisms must be effective tools for reforms and a reliable supporter (BaktemirovveRahimov, 477).

In Uzbekistan the President has got wide authorities such as defining local authorities and their elimination. Hokim for every part of the country are appointed by the president. Again, traditionally, especially with the effect of the Soviet administration, local assemblies consist of mostly bureaucrats who are brought up in Uzbekistan Communist Party (UCP).

Hokims and local-bureaucratic assemblies have got a traditional and also legal partner which is like a non-governmental structure but an entity which has got an important role in the establishment of the central authority and named as mahalla (Abramson, 1999). These entities, if conducted well, can be transformed to the tools of political propaganda. Again, they can be used as initial sources of information. Above, it is stated that mahalla keeps its origin in cooperation and traditional identity

where the traditional celebrations are organized, but it is obvious that it is being an extension of the Uzbek nomenclature. After the independence, Uzbek administration as in many other things, received formalized mahalla and by empowering the former functions to the central government it is conducted.<sup>†</sup>

Mahalla, as a term, defines the root local entity. There are nearly two thousand mahalla organizations in the country. These entities consist of 150 to 1500 residences. The number of the committees range. Every committee is led by an Aksakal. These people are elected by the citizens. In 1997, it was crucial for the candidates of the mahalla president and secretary to get the permission of the local authority (Pomfret, 2000: 18). In practice, it is stated that the committee and especially the committee presidents are mostly, teachers or lecturers. These people get salary from the government and can get retired by doing this job. Mahalla committees can make trade and can gather their income in a fund. Local authority can invest money to this fund. With an arrangement done in 1999, the mahalla committees received the authority to audit factories, health and social service institutions. One of the most important role of the mahalla committee is to spend the aid from the government to the poor and children. Committee decides on who will receive what amount of help. Moreover, the government coordinates these funds by mahalla cooperation fund (Baktemirov, Rahimov, 2001: 477-478).

Uzbek administration increased the number and the authorities of mahalla administration with the “If the mahalla is peaceful, the country is peaceful” slogan after the independence. The 105th clause of the Uzbek constitution defines mahalla as independent administration entity. The functions of these entities, election of the authorized personnel and their authorities are defined with law. Independent administrations are grouped into three categories according to the 1999 mahalla law. Settlements, kishlaks andauls can be established in the rural areas whereas mahallas can be established both in rural areas and cities as a different kind of settlement. The law doesn't recommend a quantity of growth for the mahallas. According to the law dates back to 1999, the meeting that the members of the mahalla come together is defined as “Supreme body of self government”. This entity can make a decision on the mahalla. General meetings must be held in every three months. The ruling part of the mahalla administration is the committee. Aksakal is the head of the committee and the committee carries out its mission according to the monthly held meetings. Committees can construct sub-committees according to their functions. The sub-committees are effective in every part of the mahalla life. Ceremonies such as, marriage, funeral or Sunnet are supported by these committees. The deputy of the leader of the committee is always a woman and she is the head the sub-committees which are related to the women (Human Rights Watch, 2003: 6-7).

Although all of the members of the committee are elected, it is formality in practice. As a consequence of the Soviet committee tradition, members including Aksakal, are elected in the audition of the government and the hokim who is appointed by the government (Baktemirov, Rahimov, 2001: 477).

According to the 105th clause of the constitution aksakal and adviser serve for 2,5 years.

After a short while of the release of the law in 1999, a new status is established which is named as “Posbon”. Posbon (neighborhood guardian) receives his/her salary from the government and will serve in the mahalla committee and also will help the local policeman. The number of posbons will vary according to the mahallas size (Human Rights Watch, 2003: 7).

After the year 1999, mahallas are transformed to entities which are effective tools for administration of the entities that are perceived as dangerous to the regime. With this aim, Posbon became a mediator between the local mahalla committees and governmental institutions (Sievers, 2002: 120). The 12th

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<sup>†</sup>Gleason, asserts that the dynamics of the authoritarian regime in Uzbekistan should be sought in social traditions. Gregory Gleason, “Asian Values’ and the Democratic Transition in Central Asia”, *Harvard Asia Quarterly*, 5/1, Winter 2001, (<http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~asiactr/haq/200101/0101a002.htm>).

matter of the law dates back to 1999 clearly equipped the mahalla organization for the highly religious thoughts which oppose the regime. The committees are assigned to detect the strangers and the people who are not at home for a long time.

Mahalla committees gained the right to prepare the Hacc lists. The lists were sent to Muslim Board of Uzbekistan). This authority made the mahalla committee very important for the religious Uzbek citizens. Committee gained a position which directs and promotes the religious life. In this framework, in correspondence with the local police, the committees held meetings in which they tried to explain how to use religious freedom (Human Rights Watch, 2003: 9).

On the other hand the committees are equipped with the authority to reflect the government policies and services to the people. The Parliament, the institutions which belong to the governor, ministries, tax office and The Ministry of Defense performed their services and the responsibilities with the help of the committees. Committees have the necessary statistical data that some governmental institutions need, so they have the right data in the local context (Guilty, the number of women-man-children, widow and disabled, people on the court, alcoholic people, even the rebellious youth). When they are asked about these statistics they were providing information.

Informally, some people are assigned as street representatives by the committee. These people provide continuous information about the people in their apartment building or in the street. The information which is obtained from these people was helpful to the committee in order to decide who is going to be helped, assigned, who can join celebrations and even who is going to be rewarded. The committee, by using this information can have a chance to make pre-work before mediating the conflicts between the families and the members of a family (Human Rights Watch, 2003: 10). All of these functions alienate mahalla from being a part of governance and transform it to a pressure tool of the central government.

As it can be observed mahalla committees are assigned with important roles in social formality. Gathering information about highly religious groups, the sentencing of these people in the public conscience apart from the law, the distribution of the social aid, conducting bureaucratic operations and providing documentation, following fervency in the family and divorce and helping the government in mandatory migration are the duties of the committees.

Mahalla committees play active role in detection of the highly religious groups, espionage to the authorities and making meetings in order to insult them in the society. Some of the representatives of the mahalla committees state that they are being forced to act like this. For example, with a general dismissal the prisoners were asked to write a letter in which they state that they are regretful and also they were asked to take the sponsorship of the mahalla committee. If the person who takes the sponsorship of the committee commits a crime again, the committee members will be responsible for this.

Mahalla committees have a great authority on the social aids. They use this authority in order to make the citizens act as the government wish. Again, with the guarantee of staying away from the highly religious groups, the bureaucratic operations of the citizens were becoming easier. Mahalla committees play an important role in fervency in the family and divorce. So that, if the mahalla committees are not in a deal the courts can't decide on the divorce of the people. Uzbek government gets into action in harmony with the mahalla committee in order to avoid the attacks of Uzbekistan Islamic Movement guerillas, cut their feedback and force the villagers to mandatory migration in order to control their collaborators. Mahalla committees act effectively in order to convince them to leave and also for not resist (Human Rights Watch, 2003: 12-34). In today's Uzbekistan mahalla is transformed to an administrative tool for control and support.

Mahalla committees can be organized even in apartment buildings. The government uses mahalla as the smallest unit for organizing (Arifhanova, 2001: 75). Since these organizations have the authority to distribute financial aid, reports to the Hokims, organizing the traditional ceremonies (Sünnet,

marriage), they are important in the social context. An ordinary Uzbek mahalla committee constitutes a functional mechanism in which an individual applies for help at least some times. Politically, the candidates of the assembly must get on well with these committees in order to collect enough signatures. This network operates totally bound to the central government by the local government (most of them are bureaucrats from the same region) in interaction.

Mahalla is a kind of organization from which one can understand the local entities are why so important for the Uzbek regime. Political parties which are established with Kerimov's wish in the upper, and hokims in the lower part, mahalla and the local assemblies construct the authoritarian network of the administration. It can be claimed that this process is being transformed to a public corporatist scheme. (Blua, 2004). So, neither the effect of the local people on the administration nor the transparency of the administration is possible. This means that the mahalla organization is something which is more related to the government as a spy rather than being a tool for governance. But at the first sight, Uzbek mahalla organization seems like an effective way of constructing a social platform and also a good opportunity for the distribution of the foreign aid. When a foreign aid is pronounced it is going to be the center of the conflict between the international NGOs who regard the mahalla as the actors of governance and the government and the police who are in search of using it as a pressure tool.

## 5. FOREIGN AID AND UZBEK MAHALLAS

In the beginning of 2000s, Uzbek mahalla and the social effectiveness caused by traditional role's consequence became institutionalized with the tension caused by its transformation to a tool of the authoritarian system.

Because of this tension, Uzbek Mahalla is defined in different ways because of the point of views. In this respect, mahalla was originally a traditional institution which served as a tool for governance by providing social services in the past. So, it might have been used as an effective way of distributing the international aid via social cooperation. On the other hand, mahalla was the eye of the government for the strict control of the people. They might act as difficulties for democracy and governance paradoxically.

In 2001, the attack to the buildings of World Trade Center in New York effected the Uzbekistan-USA relations deeply. Uzbekistan supported USA's operations in Afghanistan. As a result, it had to develop its relationships with the western countries in many areas. This process prepared a basis for the refreshment of the foreign aid facilities in Uzbekistan again. At the same time the paradoxal place of Uzbek Mahalla in the society became more visible and this led much discussion.

Uzbekistan-USA relationships developed from the year 1995. This also drew the attention of the international organizations and also their activities (Masaru: 353). After September 11, it is observed that USA and the other western countries prioritized Uzbekistan in aid. The conceptual mistake of the USA-centered-aid was not totally analyzing the Uzbek institutions (Seiple, 2005: 254). In 2003, the number of foreign aid institutions in Uzbekistan was nearly, 500 (Seiple, 2005: 256). Hence, it was important to find reliable partners in this country. In this process Uzbek mahallas drew much attention and became more important.

A range of international organizations has worked with mahalla committees in Uzbekistan. These include the United Nations Development Program, Tacis (the development arm of the European Union), the Counterpart Consortium (with USAID funding), the Konrad Adenauer Foundation (with Swiss and German government funding), and the Open Society Institute. Some of them have worked through the Mahalla Fund, and organization set up by government decree in 1992 to channel funds to the mahallas (HumanRights Watch, 2003: 35).

The international aid caused by the Uzbek-USA relations depicted that the NGO cooperation does not satisfy the neo-liberal expectations. Initially, the mahalla organizations which are regarded as the

closest entities by the international aid institutions are used as the auditing and snitching the facilities of these institutions to the Uzbek government. Since Uzbek mahalla organizations are, as stated above, the entities which serve to the central authority, they worked more closely to the government. This triggered a tension and conflict rather than governance.

Uzbekistan faces a tension because of the system which is shaped by Kerimov and the foreign affairs again shaped by his wishes. A closeness process has started with an agreement with USA by the year 2002; however this process caused some pressure on the system.

In the year 2003, pressure is increased by the government on the NGOs who are blamed for the source of the pressure to the system. Moreover the government reconsidered its relationships with the NGOs because of the events in Georgia. AzizullaGaziev (a research analyst in International Crisis Group) was forced to leave the country after being interrogated by UGS (National Security Service). The Institute for War and Peace Reporting lost its legal status in Ministry of Foreign Affairs in November. In 2003, the government increased the pressure on Human of Rights Watch Bureau in Tashkent. In December 2003, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that every NGO should renew its registration by the first of March, 2004. The aim of this activity was to increase the pressure on the NGOs. This movement drew the attention of the international community. USA consisted on making financial help to the NGOs which are registered to the Ministry if they mutually make an agreement. While the cultural and humanistic organizations were afraid of paying taxes and being claimed, the government officials state that the international institutions are exaggerating and they will register them if they want easily (ICG Central Asia Report, 2004: 7-8).

Uzbekistan government rejected the application of Open Society Institute in 14<sup>th</sup> of April, 2004. The reason for refusal was the institute's behavior harming the authority of the government. It is stated that the organization made nearly 22 million dollars aid to different projects from the year 1996. Just as, Uzbekistan's decision announced, USA Congress made a decision on if Uzbekistan doesn't make necessary arrangements in human rights, it is not going to let the financial aid (Eurasia Insight, 2004). In June, 2004; Uzbekistan government established a commission on the financial auditing of the NGOs and started to investigate all of the foreign supported projects (Erlich, 2004).

The foreign aid, placing the opposition in the regime, facilities of some USA-centered organizations caused some problems by the beginning of 2004. Such kinds of organizations increase their activities especially parallel to getting closer with USA. Uzbek administration also regretted the Brussels-centered International Crisis Group and London-centered War and Peace Watching Institute. Open Society Institute and Human Rights Watch are asked to bring their papers to the Ministry of Justice for registration. (Blua, 02 March 2004). The common point in these institutions is their claim on Uzbek government doesn't fulfill its responsibilities in 2002 agreement, and by doing so it doesn't do any reforms on human rights, political and economic areas and keep on being an authoritarian regime and also USA government doesn't see all of these because of the wish to be in an agreement and their activities on drawing attention of the people all the time to this topic.

It is reported that the aids to institutions for security and law were 79 million \$ for 2002 and 30 million \$ for 2003. (ICG Central Asia Report, 2004: 25).

The report "Middle Asia and Operational Planning in USA Strategy" released in 2004 by Foreign Policies Analysis Institute (an institute which is known as close to the USA) constituted tangible evidence for the tension between Bush administration and Uzbekistan. The document which includes clues for USA's new Middle Asia Strategy criticizes Uzbekistan for using the environment after the September 11 attacks suitably for its sake and undermining USA's strategy in the region and Bush administration was advised to make pressure on the Uzbek administration on reforms and to suspend the financial aids till January, 2006 (Davis & Sweeney, 2004). Michael Sweeney (one of the people who prepared the material) claim that USA is still acting with the shock of the Sep. 11 attacks and

approaches in the long term should only make sense rather than harming USA's international image by using mid-term strategies. According to Sweeney, Uzbekistan administration has much in the destruction of this image and it should be forced to make reforms. Otherwise, USA administration should cooperate with other countries (Blua, 22 February 2004).

Beginning in March, 2004, the events took place in May, 2005 ended the closeness of USA and Uzbekistan. The bombing actions in Tashkent and Bukhara in 28<sup>th</sup>-29<sup>th</sup> March and the continuing battles showed the existence of the Islamic Groups in the country and also stated that the relations that Uzbekistan tried to establish were useless. The size of the events is interesting. In the evening of 28<sup>th</sup> March, a bomb exploded in front of the Prime Minister's residence and later on long battles are performed around a tractor factory (nearly 2km<sup>2</sup>) between the security and an armed group. The day after the events, explosions occurred in a house in Bukhara (one of the main cities). After a while 3 bombing events occurred in Tashkent and nearby (İsmaïlov, 30 March 2004). Battles are reported in 30<sup>th</sup> March in Yunus Abad, and in Andican in 31<sup>st</sup> of March. The organization of the events and their scarcity was destroying for the control ability and reliability of the Uzbek secret service. Thus, Islamic groups showed that they also live in that country and they targeted buildings including the residence of the Prime Minister (İsmaïlov, 31 March 2004).<sup>‡</sup>Two terrorist attacks occurred in 30<sup>th</sup> of July targeting the USA and Israel embassies and 5 security officers are killed.

After all these events, it is highly meaningful that Uzbek administration started to criticize USA's regional politics. Uzbek officials started to claim that the required economical reforms don't cope with the country's facts, the activities of the international aid organizations minimize the authority of the government in struggling with terrorism and the integration of political reforms to cooperation with US will not prevent people from terror. Parallel to this, beginning before the September 11 attack, but interfered with the relations with US, the Uzbek-Russia rapprochement started to outshine again.

In his speech in December 8, President Kerimov was criticizing as: ... International organizations and some Western countries oppress to Uzbekistan and want us to adopt the values of Western democracy and human rights which are not familiar with Uzbek society and it is impossible to agree with this (ICG Central Asia Report, 2004: 28).

These improvements revealed two tendencies in the cooperation of the international aid organizations and mahalla committees. The first tendency asserted that the mahalla committees act as the spy of the government and refused to take in action with them. For example, in 1999 and 2000, The Open Society Institute worked with mahalla committees as a part of its Local government Initiatives, designed to strengthen community participation in local government. By the end of the Project, however, the Open Society Institute decided not to continue the program, recognizing that, on the whole, mahalla committees are controlled by the hokimiat and are therefore not an appropriate body to encourage community participation (Human Rights Watch, 2003: 35).

But some other organizations kept working with mahalla. For example, the Konrad Adenauer Foundation has run national conferences and training programs for government and mahalla officials to promote the Notion of the mahalla committee as a means of decentralization. The assumption in these programs is that the mahalla system in Uzbekistan can be used effectively to promote human rights, democracy, and civil society and no distinction appears to be made between the traditional mahalla system and the current government-led mahalla committee system. As a result, HWR warned the international organizations on the possibility of the mahalla being an entity which supports the control system of the government if the relations are not defined properly, in 2003 (Human Rights Watch, 2003: 35).

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<sup>‡</sup>According to the official numbers 47 lost their lives.

## 6. CONCLUSION

Uzbekistan constitutes a good example of the problems that a country may face with the distribution of the aid in cooperation of the non-governmental organizations and governance network. With the help of an analysis of the Uzbek mahalla without considering the traditional and modern functions of it might direct the researchers to the result that it can be used as a subject of the governance network as an effective and functional non-governmental organization. But a detailed analysis will depict that the mahalla is transformed to a crucial matter of the authoritarian administration rather than being a non-governmental organization, especially after 1999. It is interesting that the US administration tried to use these organizations as a partner in the delivery and distribution of the foreign aid program. In the end, the foreign aid program practitioners and international NGOs are blamed for being the mediator of some human rights abuse.

Uzbekistan puts forth the question that how should be the efficient governance. While conducting foreign aid campaigns, it is crucial to answer what are the traditional values and what really represents the non-governmental organizations. In countries, where the non-governmental organizations are not supported well, the NGOs are structured as fake-institutionalizing and should be demonstrated as social auditors. This is done by mahallaorganisations in Uzbekistan.

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