

Received-Makale Geliş Tarihi 16.05.2024
Published-Yayınlanma Tarihi 30.06.2024
Volume-Cilt (Issue-Sayı), ss/pp 11(108), 1249-1256

Research Article/Araştırma Makalesi
10.5281/zenodo.12638845

Yahaya Halidu

<https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5290-6379>

Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University, Institute of Social Sciences; Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Ankara / TÜRKİYE
ROR Id: <https://ror.org/05ryemn72>

Alhassan Abdul-Rahman

<https://orcid.org/0009-0008-1805-9234>

The Ohio State University, College of Arts and Sciences, Department of History, Columbus, Ohio/ USA
ROR Id: <https://ror.org/00rs6vg23>

History of Foreign Partnership in the Development of Islamic Education in Ghana (1980s & 1990s)

Gana'da İslam Eğitiminin Geliştirilmesinde Yabancı İşbirliği ve Dış Ortaklığın Kısa Bir Tarihi İncelenmesi (1980'ler ve 1990'lar)

ABSTRACT

In the 1980s and 1990s, Muslim NGOs especially those of Muslim women, sprang up focusing on the development of Islamic education in Ghana. Although there has been enough literature on the development of Islamic education, much is left out on the historical factors that motivated the establishment of these NGOs. This paper seeks to fill this void and argues that the NGOs did not develop out of nothing. Their formation was motivated by the influx of international partners in both economic and educational developments in Ghana. Thus, although internal factors were very important in generating progress in education, international relations that connected to domestic policies were equally important.

Keywords: Islamic Education, Structural Adjustment Program, Development Partners, Economic Recovery Program, Ghana, NGO's, Muslims.

ÖZET

1980'lerde ve 1990'larda Müslüman STK'lar, özellikle de Müslüman kadınlara yönelik olanlar, Gana'da İslami eğitimin geliştirilmesine odaklanarak ortaya çıkmıştır. İslami eğitimin gelişimi konusunda yeterli literatür bulunmasına rağmen, bu STK'ların kurulmasını motive eden tarihsel faktörlere ilişkin pek çok şey atlanmıştır. Bu makale bu boşluğu doldurmayı amaçlamaktadır. Oluşumları, Gana'daki hem ekonomik hem de eğitimsel gelişmelere uluslararası ortakların akın etmesiyle motive edilmiştir. Dolayısıyla, eğitimde ilerleme sağlanmasında iç faktörler çok önemli olsa da iç politikalarla bağlantılı uluslararası ilişkiler de aynı derecede önemli olmuştur.

Anahtar Kelimeler: İslami Eğitim, Yapısal Uyum Programı, Kalkınma Ortakları, Ekonomik İyileşme Programı, Gana, STK'lar, Müslümanlar.

1. INTRODUCTION

In the late 1970s, many scholars started researching into the transformation of Islamic education in Africa. Pioneering works of Africanist scholars¹ analyzed the transition from Qur'anic schooling characterized by rote learning to a madrasa system that included the study of Arabic grammar and other aspects of the Islamic sciences which were organized in an improved curriculum. However, from the late twentieth century onwards, attention gradually shifted from purely focusing on madrasa education to studying the history and processes of the inclusion of secular curriculum into madrasa schooling, especially the Franco-Arab schools in French-speaking West Africa that began as early as the 1950s. Several scholars have also done similar studies in English-speaking countries as well. Notwithstanding the many studies on Islamic education in Ghana and other regions in West Africa, not much has been done on the role of international agencies and the evolution of Muslim NGOs in Ghana. This paper aims to fill this lacuna in the broad but

¹ These works include: Lansin Kaba, *The Wahhabiyya: Islamic reform and politics in French West Africa* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974); David Skinner, "Islam and Education in the Colony and Hinterland of Sierra Leone (1750–1914)." *Canadian Journal of African Studies/La Revue canadienne des études africaines*, 10 (3) (1976): 499–520; Lamin Sanneh, *The crown and the turban: Muslims and West African pluralism* (London: Westview Press, 1997).

often neglected history of Islamic education in Ghana. The paper argues that Muslim NGOs did not develop out of nothing. It was motivated by the influx of international development partners in both economic and educational developments beginning in the 1980s. Thus, although internal factors were very important in generating progress in education, the international community that connected to domestic policies of Ghana's education was equally important. Although with all the huge amounts of domestic and foreign support for education from the 1980s and the 1990s in Ghana, the quality of education did not improve that much, it provided some benefits and became a source of inspiration to Muslims to develop their education further. The paper also shows the conflicting agendas between donors and recipients in their quest to work together to develop education in the country.

2. OVERVIEW OF FOREIGN PARTNERSHIP AND EDUCATION IN GHANA

Partnership is defined as an understanding between different actors expressing reciprocal rights and obligations aimed at a clear goal of mutual benefit. It is usually a two-way affair based on shared liberties, duties and trust. The relationship is mostly rooted in an agreement that reveals shared objectives through a mutually agreed division of labor. From the 1980s, over 20 multilateral and bilateral donors became heavily involved in Ghana's education sector offering myriads of support including direct allocation of resources and policy interventions². The discussion of the development of Islamic education cannot be isolated from the general discussions on education in Ghana. This is because since 1987, Islamic education has officially become part of the educational system of the country.

Although there are some private Islamic schools in Ghana, in 1987, the government of Ghana officially incorporated an integrated Islamic education into mainstream education in Ghana. The integrated system combined both religious and secular knowledge and subjects were taught in one curriculum. To further develop its structure and maintain good supervision, the government inaugurated the Islamic Education Unit to manage the system. This marked a turning point in the development of Islamic education in Ghana. Access to both secular and religious knowledge expanded and for the first time, Muslim girls' enrolment increased in all the regions of the country. The incorporation of the integrated system meant that any changes that affected the country's education also affected Islamic education. Thus, efforts of the Development Partners (DPs) in the area of education affected both the general educational system and that of the Islamic education, in particular. Moreover, some Muslim local NGOs directly received funding from some international developmental partners.

The 1980s is a benchmark in international influence on education in Ghana. Enock Nyarkoh and Emmanuel Intsiful³ assert that in the 1960s and the 1970s, Ghana's educational policies focused on higher education with funding largely coming from the state. Higher education at these periods was considered the only means to produce the skilled manpower needed to harness the developmental agenda of the state. However, in the 1980s, attention was given to basic level education with several financial commitments from the international donor community. This was partly because the international community saw basic education as the most salient way to eradicate poverty, especially in developing countries. Thus, the sector received considerable assistance in myriad ways including loans, grants, credits and technical assistance. Nyarkoh and Intsiful (2018, p45) argue further that in terms of access, financing and infrastructure, the international stakeholders' efforts in developing education especially at the basic level have been positive. In as much as this assertion is true about the quality they argue, it is also imperative to assert that improvement in access, financing and infrastructure without improving the quality of education leaves much to be desired. Moreover, these foreign supports came with conditions that forced the government sometimes to kowtow to the donor or partner countries instead of improving quality⁴.

Historically, two main socio-political factors fed into the springing of international partners in the 1980s. The first was the effects of the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) that Ghana was plunged into and the 1987 educational reform program. Samantha Terry provides that the economic downturn that forced Ghana to accept the SAP in the 1980s started from the economic policies of British imperialists from the 1920s. The British implemented a Ten-Year Development Program from 1920-1930 that focused on international trade instead of internal growth. Although transportation infrastructure was built, only areas such as ports and major railway lines were prioritized to facilitate international trade rather than the internal movement

² Leslie Casely-Hayford, Robert Palmer, Charles Ayamdoo, and Nii Moi Thompson, "Aid and Donor Partnerships in Ghana's education Sector, 1987-2007: A critical Review of the Literature and Progress." (2007), p.9.

³ Enoch Nyarkoh, Emmanuel Intsiful. "An assessment of the impact of international aid on basic education in Ghana." *American Journal of Educational Research* 6, no. 1 (2018): p.45.

⁴ Ibid.

of goods and labor. Coupled with the Great Depression and inadequate financial support from the British government, the plan did not achieve the desired results⁵.

As Ghana attained independence from the British in 1957, the newly formed government adopted socialist economic practices that involved the public in regulating industrial activities. Meanwhile, the country depended heavily on cocoa exports for its industrial growth. With the fall in global market prices during the early 1960s, the Nkrumah government was left without substantial income to sustain its socialist development plan. The private sector and his opponents also criticized him for adopting frequent import and price controls that were geared towards attracting foreign investment and weakening his political opponents. Consequently, the new administration developed the economy and provided ample industrial establishments, several economic challenges such as the drop in global cocoa prices in the 1960s left the country with economic downturns. Subsequently, Kwame Nkrumah was overthrown, but the governments that succeeded faced several military coups that did not help in any substantial economic progress for the country. Furthermore, Africa experienced intense drought during the period that deeply affected its agricultural sector: the backbone of its progress⁶.

Building up to the 1980s, the government of the Provisional Defense Council (PNDC) which took over power in 1979 adopted an agricultural-based economy that it had inherited from its predecessors. This made several industrial infrastructures that were built by previous administrations redundant. As a result of the problem of drought coupled with poorly implemented economic development plans due to political upheavals, Ghana was plunged into commodity shortages and soaring inflation rates. By 1983, Ghana was on the verge of 'collapsing.' It experienced an intense economic bankruptcy that forced the PNDC government to decide to borrow from the IMF. Consequently, the IMF engaged Ghana in the SAP and in a way to help relieve the country from its economic burden, the country was forced to adopt neoliberal economic policies as prescribed by the structural adjustment. There are dissenting opinions about whether the SAP helped Ghana or not, but this paper shall not delve into that argument. Suffice it to say that although from the early 1980s to early 1990s gross national investments rose from 3.7% to 16% and inflation declined from an average annual rate of 73 % to about 13 % as well as other positive indicators, it brought intense hardships to Ghanaian citizens⁷.

The implementation of SAP in Ghana demanded reducing the government's expenditure by cuts in social services such as education and privatization of state-owned enterprises. The country was also made to take loans to help increase its production. Ghana's economy was financed by over six billion dollars in loans from the World Bank and other financial institutions. As a result of these policies, poverty was higher after the SAP than before. Although minimum wage increased, prices of food increased and higher payment for school fees and social services became the norm. For example, in 1989, rates for water were raised between 150 to 11, 150 % and for electricity by 47 to 80 %. High costs prevented many houses from accessing those services⁸. As government allocation for schools was reduced, there was the need to seek international partners to support the development of the education sector through the provision of infrastructure, teaching materials and staff training.

The situation with education was so bad that external funding became a necessity. The severe economic hardship forced many teachers to leave Ghana to neighboring countries such as Nigeria to seek employment. Nyarkoh and Intsiful reiterate that by 1983, over 50 % of Ghanaian teachers had left the country. GDP for education declined from 6.4 % to 1.4 %⁹. The problems in education precipitated the 1987 educational reforms. As was articulated by many authors earlier, the reform program in 1987 was part of the economic recovery and the structural adjustment program of the Breton Wood Institution. Leslie Casely-Hayford et.al assert that

“The main objectives of the reform program were to increase access to basic education, make education more cost effective and improve the quality of education by making it more responsive to the needs and conditions of the country. This reform perhaps is the most comprehensive of all

⁵ Terry, Samantha. "International Monetary Fund Structural Adjustment Policy and Loan Conditionality in Ghana: Economic, Cultural, and Political Impacts." (2019), p.11.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Aramide Odotayo, "Conditional Development: Ghana Crippled by Structural Adjustment Programme." Retrieved February 8, 2024. (2020): p.12.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Enoch Nyarkoh, Emmanuel Intsiful. "An assessment of the impact of international aid on basic education in Ghana". (2018). p.46.

the education reforms Ghana has ever introduced.... The government of the day concentrated resources on basic education, and technical and vocational education.”¹⁰

The idea was partly to provide the youth with employable skills to bring about development after many years of economic challenges, but these domestic policies were pushed by the donor community. This point will be articulated in greater detail in the later part of this paper. It is evident that the economic downturn that Ghana experienced especially in the 1980s affected almost everything in Ghana including education. And in solving the economic problems, the international community especially non-Muslim development partners was called. The influx of International Islamic donors into the country echoes similar reasons but diverts in many ways. As Kobo argues, they were mostly invited by local NGOs to support the communities in Ghana. The local NGOs took advantage of the development of education in the 1980s to create awareness of the need to support Islamic schools in the country. Other international Islamic donors such as the Islamic Development Bank sometimes worked with the Ghana government directly.

2.1 Developmental Partners and Islamic Education

The main Development Partners include the World Bank, the European Union, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), the U.K’s Department for International Development (DFID) and United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Others were the World Food Program (WFP), the United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) and the African Development Bank (AfDB). In assessing the engagements between these DPs and the Ghana government from 1987 to the mid-1990s, Casely-Hayford and others contend that donor funds to education depended on conditions to be followed by the Ghana government as was set by the World Bank and the IMF, either for themselves or on behalf of donors. The nature of the conditions varied from donor to donor, but in some cases, some conditions were regarded as ‘*performance criterion*’ while others were called ‘*structural benchmark*’ and ‘*prior conditions*’.¹¹

The World Bank was very influential among all the development partners in supporting the 1978 education reform with two sector adjustment credits. They were the Education Sector Adjustment Credit (EdSAC) I (1986-91) and EdSAC II (1990-94). Furthermore, the bank supported the education component of the Health and Education Rehabilitation Project (HERP) (1986-91). Most of the funds in both (EdSAC) I and II were used for building, equipment, furniture, and vehicles. Other partners including USAID and UNICEF among other donors, helped to fulfill the reform’s objective of increasing access to education to all children including females. Sutherland-Addy asserts that USAID together with some local partners strengthened public and private sector institutions to promote girls’ education. They also helped to develop local resources to support girl’s education, namely: human, financial and physical¹².

World Bank often imposed conditions on the Ghana government that she (the nation Ghana), sometimes just became passives of the bank’s agendas. Irrespective of the conditions, Casely-Hayford and others argue that for the 1987 education reforms, ‘*domestic ownership*’ of the entire process was very strong. This though, did not mean that there were no disagreements over various aspects of the reforms. For example, the Bank resisted the vocationalization of the curriculum, contrary to the desires of the Ghanaian government. Certainly, the vocationalization element of the Junior Secondary School (then the JSS and now known as the Junior High School) system was very important to the government in its bid to develop and galvanize the youth with the technical and vocational skills needed for the country’s overall economic development. The Economic Recovery Program (ERP) pulled heavily on the 1972 Dzobo Educational Reform Committee. Upon the government’s persistence in maintaining the program, the World Bank in the end accepted. For Casely-Hayford and the others, the bank retained the policy so as to continue to support the education sector. Also significantly at the time, a crucial point worthy of note is the fact that, they did not also find any alternative(s)¹³.

¹⁰ Leslie Casely-Hayford, Robert Palmer, Charles Ayamdo, and Nii Moi Thompson, “*Aid and Donor Partnerships in Ghana’s education Sector, 1987-2007*”: p.45.

¹¹ Leslie Casely-Hayford, Robert Palmer, Charles Ayamdo, and Nii Moi Thompson, “*Aid and Donor Partnerships in Ghana’s education Sector, 1987-2007*”: Ibid. p.46.

¹² Ibid. p.133.

¹³ Ibid.

Crucially, Casely-Hayford and others continue to contend that, the then Minister of Education between 1993-1997, Harry Sawyerr, commended the international donor support in helping to develop Ghana's education system, but was quick to add that, the Ghanaian government was firmly in charge of the policy, direction and donor coordination. However, in some situations, the Bank got its way. The Bank, within the framework of ERP, used the influence of EdSAC I and II to exert some pressure on the government. For instance, while the Bank unwillingly accepted the government's vocationalization policy, it influenced the government to confine vocational training at the JSS level to only the introduction of tools. In another instance, the Bank influenced the shape and form of the education reform programs altogether. It persuaded the government not to increase the scope of secondary schools too quickly, but to concentrate instead on basic education. The government was very passionate about expanding senior secondary education more rapidly to about 50 % coverage, but the Bank insisted otherwise. Consequently, the government had to accept the 30% coverage¹⁴.

The conditions attached to the EdSAC II included the requirement that the Ghana government keep its recurrent basic education budget at 62%. Furthermore, the conditionalities attached to both EdSACs were that both parties; the government and the Bank, should agree on the size of the education budget. When this was not successfully negotiated or achieved as per their desired results, the Bank was not happy. For example, in 1990, the government's overspending on tertiary and vocational education led to serious frictions and tensions between the government and the Bank. A few examples of conflicting views on budget and type of educational program showed that the partnership was not always mutual. But what led the Bank to be reluctant about the vocationalization of the JSS and even the Senior Secondary School (SSS)¹⁵? In any case, the primary goal of both technical and vocational education is essential for the technological advancements of any nation. Although Casely-Hayford did not provide a strong reason why the Bank was reluctant about vocationalization, Baldwin, in his *Economic Statecraft*, provides an extensive analysis of three theoretical problems¹⁶ associated with the debate about foreign aid.

Although foreign aid helped in alleviating the effects of WW2 and promoting the European Recovery Program, it did not wholly and successfully work with the third world. The conventional knowledge about foreign aid that it stimulates economic development did not apply to poor countries. The reason for this lies in the conceptualizations and the theoretical problems associated with the study of foreign aid. The first problem is about defining and measuring foreign aid: whether it is a gift or not. The second has to do with the concept of not giving aid while the third involves the effectiveness of measuring aid. Baldwin's analysis largely focuses on the 1940s and the 1950s US foreign policies vis-a-vis her foreign aid, but his principles on measuring the effectiveness of a foreign aid is relevant in assessing the DPs efforts in developing education in Ghana. Among the principles are those which concern form of aid and the unintended resultant conflict that ensued between donors and recipient. On the principle of conflict matter, Baldwin asserts that

“Aid relationships, like most other social relationships, involve both conflicting and common interests. Even when many goals are shared, there is likely to be disagreement between donor and recipient with respect to the amount, timing, and terms of aid. (Usually, recipients would like more, sooner, and with fewer strings.) The best way to approach aid transactions is also the best way to think about social relations in general, i.e., as mixed-motive games rather than as zero-sum or purely cooperative games.”¹⁷

From the above, the effectiveness of any aid depends on the perspective of the one analyzing it. The mere presence of conflict does not mean that a particular aid is not effective. With respect to the DP's involvement in education, there are those who think that it did not increase the quality of education in Ghana although there were some massive infrastructural developments. The reduction in social spending (a condition of the SAPs) culminated in cutting down on education, health, water and sanitation. Cost sharing and other conditionalities kept the poor people away from school. Plausibly, those who associate poor education outcomes with donor conditionalities may have been right. Several studies show that many poor households could not afford to send their kids to school, and in the process dropped girls altogether from schools in preference for boys. The conditionalities attached to donor support to education in the 1980s undermined the effectiveness of donor aid to education in Ghana. The 1987 education sector reforms with the conditionalities perpetuated a partial and/or progressive diminution of the role of the state in the

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Now known as the senior High School, (SHS)

¹⁶ Baldwin, David A. *Economic Statecraft: New Edition*. (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2020), p.318.

¹⁷ Ibid.

provision of basic education and other social services, which contributed to a fall in enrollments and low completion rates. However, some of the partners focused their assistance on the less endowed regions such as the Northern and Upper Regions of the country. Incidentally, Muslims dominate the Northern Sector. Thus, from the 1980s, Muslim wards saw improvements at least in accessing secular education as well as participating in educational activities organized by the partners.

2.2 International Muslim Support Schemes and Islamic Education

Kobo suggests that the growth and development of Islamic NGOs throughout Africa are related to the activities of Salafi/ Wahhabi theological and educational activism¹⁸. Most of the founders of these NGOs were graduates of Middle Eastern Universities who sought to attract financial and educational resources from donors and philanthropists in Saudi Arabia and other rich Arab nations. As Kobo and others have observed, international Muslim support schemes target myriads of activities. They include creating and managing orphanages, building and managing Islamic schools and hospitals as well as building wells in rural areas and supplying educational materials.

Kobo adds that in general, sub-Saharan African Islamic NGOs focus primarily on issues of poverty and their basic source of funding comes from the Arab world. Some also secure assistance through the collection of annual zakat and donations from wealthy individuals. In this paper though, our interest is the international donations and how they support Islamic education. Between 1986 and 2005, the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) sponsored 221 students to study medicine and engineering at some select universities in Türkiye in order to increase the population of Muslim doctors and engineers later in the country. They also constructed Islamic schools (madrasa) in Muslim communities in Northern Ghana to facilitate the acquisition of both religious and secular knowledge. Furthermore, they provided laboratory and science equipments to schools in Ghana to facilitate the study of science in the country.

Apart from IDB, NGOs in Ghana such as the Al-Muntada Education Trust and Al-Huda Islamic Society solicited funding mostly from the Arab world to construct Islamic centers for the memorization of the Qur'an and the distribution of Islamic literature. Al-Huda also engages in providing social amenities and building schools and Islamic cultural centers since 1992¹⁹. Irrespective of the few in-roads made in the development of Islamic education, the major part has been in the constructions of mosques. Indeed, Holger Weiss contends that since the 1990s, many Muslim NGOs have commissioned projects, but mosques have been the foremost in these projects. Some of these NGOs include the Islamic Council for Development and Humanitarian Services (ICODEHS, established in 1991), Muslim Family Council Services (MFCS, established in 1990) and Muslim Relief Association (MURAG, established in 1986).

On the social impact of these NGOs, Weiss articulates that notwithstanding their efforts, local people have mixed feelings about their activities²⁰. Whereas educational and other social infrastructure are welcomed and have positive impacts, building of mosques have been criticized by local Muslim intellectuals and authorities. Their main argument is that the mosques do not normally serve the needs of the people. Scholars from both Tamale in the Northern and Accra in the Greater Accra regions respectively contend that it is mostly easier to secure funding from the international Muslim aid in building mosques than projects such as resources for staff salaries.

Weiss continues to advance the discourse further that, for Muslim communities in Ghana to get funding for an educational or social welfare project, it must be tied to a mosque complex. In other words, mosques became the primary focus in obtaining some other infrastructural developments. This does not allow for an integrated approach to solving the problems of the communities. In doing so, Weiss reiterates the views of Muslim intellectuals that international donors are flexible in allowing funds to be used in solving emerging social problems such as disparity in education except the building of mosques. One wonders about the huge sums of funds that are spent on mosque building projects by foreign donors and their Ghanaian initiators with its restricted social impact. This has raised enough concerns among Muslim scholars about the philosophy behind the promotion of development assistance. Weiss suggests that part of the problem is that most of the funds these NGOs use are from foreign sources²¹. Thus, the nature of the Ghanaian NGOs itself is a huge part-and-parcel of the existential problem. Very few resources are channeled towards

¹⁸ Ousman Murzik Kobo "Islamic Institutions of Higher Learning in Ghana: The Case of the Islamic University College" In *Muslim Institutions of Higher Education in Postcolonial Africa*, ed. Mbaye Lo and Muhammed Haron (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), pp.180-184.

¹⁹ Ibid.p.171.

²⁰ Weiss, Holger. "The expansion of Muslim NGOs in Ghana." *ISIM Review* 20, no. 1 (2007):13.

²¹ Ibid.

improving education. This definitely led to poor quality of education among Muslim students right from the onset.

One of the sectors that got motivated by the DPs was Muslim women activism. From the 1990s, Muslim women formed NGOs to help tackle the problem of access to secular knowledge for their female wards. As stated earlier, by the 1980s, both international policies on gender equity in education and national affirmative actions for gender justice had become a practice. The Educational Reform program in 1986/87 by the Ghana government included aims to foster increased enrollment for girls' education²². It was within this period that the Islamic Education Unit (IEU) was inaugurated. Thus, the inauguration of the IEU coincided with greater awareness of gender equity in education in Ghana. Having been denied access to education up until the 1990s, Muslim women activists in the 1990s found ways to support female children to enroll into the secondary and tertiary institutions. Some of the women became seasoned educationists, serving in several official positions within the Ministry of Education and the Ghana Education Service. Others joined Women NGOs that are aimed at progress towards supporting the socio-economic development of women in general.

Prominent among these NGOs include the Islamic Charity Centre for Women Orientation (ICCWO), Banatul-Sobr Educational Center and the Federation of Muslim Women Association of Ghana (FOMWAG). With the help of international donors, these NGOs organized and supported various programs, especially those that concerned education. Banatul-Sobr for example, established a library in 1999 in Choggu, a suburb of Tamale in the Northern region of Ghana. The library was to facilitate access to useful religious and secular educational materials for both school children especially females and Muslim women who had secular knowledge but lacked Islamic religious knowledge²³. Many Muslims in the area visited the facility to enhance their reading capabilities while meeting friends and adults who could help them with their assignments. Muslim women activities made several interventions in Muslim girls' education, but this paper may not have the ample space to discuss all of such viably useful interventions. Muslim women's advocacy groups and NGOs such as the Federation of Muslim Women Association of Ghana (FOMWAG), inaugurated in 1997, emphasized Muslim female education. Individual women also contributed immensely towards Muslim women's education even before most of the Muslim NGOs²⁴.

3. CONCLUSION

According to Baldwin, two views are expressed in the discussion of whether foreign aid is a gift or not. While some think that foreign aid is a unilateral international transfer of resources, others see it as a reciprocal exchange of benefits. Meanwhile, determining any of these with regard to DPs in education is a complex exercise. This paper's interest did not lie in doing an extensive examination of whether DPs unilaterally transfer resources or otherwise. Instead, the paper shows that DPs have very much been involved in the development of Ghana's education in general and Islamic education in particular. What is salient in this discussion is that, although in some cases there were noticeable conflicts between donors and recipients, DPs provision of funds including loans and grants came in handy and right in time to rescue the nation's educational system from collapse in the 1980s. Consequently, most Muslim NGOs sprang up especially in the 1990s to focus on the educational development of Muslim wards. While the DPs especially the World Bank, were constantly accused of forcing recipients to abandon part of its projects, Muslim intellectuals criticized international Muslim donors for over-emphasizing building mosques rather than broadening the skills and human-resource capacity of Muslims, especially the females.

²² Esi Sutherland-Addy, *Impact assessment study of the girls' education programme in Ghana* (Ghana: UNICEF, 2002), 75-76.

²³ Fatimatu N-eyare Sulemanu, "Education as a Tool for Sustainable Development: The Role of Muslim NGOs in Ghana" in *Religion and Sustainable Development: Ghanaian Perspectives*, p.256.

²⁴ Rabiātu Ammah, "Islam, gender, and leadership in Ghana." *Cross Currents* 63, no. 2 (2013): p.249.

REFERENCES

- Baldwin, D. A. (2020). *Economic Statecraft*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Casely-Hayford, L., Palmer, R., Ayamdoo, C., & Thompson, N. M. (2007). *Aid and donor partnerships in Ghana's education sector, 1987-2007: a critical review of the literature and progress*. University of Cambridge, Faculty of Education, Research Consortium on Educational Outcomes and Poverty (RECOUP). <https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-69597>
- Kobo, O. M. (2016). *Islamic Institutions of Higher Learning in Ghana: The Case of the Islamic University College*. In *Muslim Institutions of Higher Education in Postcolonial Africa* (pp.179-191). New York: Palgrave Macmillan US. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9781137552310_11
- Sutherland-Addy, E. (2002). *Impact assessment study of the girls' education programme in Ghana*. UNICEF Ghana. 75-76.
- Sulemanu, N, F. (2018). *Education as a Tool for Sustainable Development: The Role of Muslim NGOs in Ghana*. In Batsa GO, Gatti N & Ammah RD (eds), *Religion and Sustainable Development: Ghanaian Perspectives*. Citta del Vaticano: Ubarniana University Press, (243-258).
- Nyarkoh, E. & Intsiful, E. (2018). An Assessment of the Impact of International Aid on Basic Education in Ghana. *American Journal of Educational Research*. 6, 43-49.
- Odutayo, A. (2020). *Conditional Development: Ghana Crippled by Structural Adjustment Programmes*.
- Ammah, R. (2013). Islam, Gender, and Leadership in Ghana. *Cross Currents*, 63 (2), 227–257.
- Terry, S. (2019). *International Monetary Fund Structural Adjustment Policy and Loan Conditionality in Ghana: Economic, Cultural, and Political Impacts*. (Unpublished Senior Theses). UVM Honors College Senior Theses. 319. <https://scholarworks.uvm.edu/hcoltheses/319>
- Weiss, H. (2007). *The Expansion of Muslim NGOs in Ghana*. *Isim Review*, 20(1), 12-13.