THE The Intersection of Self and World: An Evaluation of Kant's Transcendental Apperception

Abstract

This article explores the ideas about self ("I") in the philosophies of Descartes, Leibniz, Hume, and Kant, examining how the understanding of self-awareness and consciousness evolved prior to Kant. Descartes grounds the certainty of self-existence with the famous dictum "Cogito, ergo sum" ("I think, therefore I am"), positing that the self is a thinking substance distinct from the body. Leibniz develops this idea further, suggesting that humans uniquely possess self-consciousness, which he attributes to a special kind of monad. In contrast, Hume denies the existence of a substantive self, arguing instead that what we call the "self" is merely a bundle of experiences and perceptions, devoid of any true, unchanging core. He rejects the possibility of a priori knowledge of the self, viewing it as a complex of impressions and ideas without substantial existence.

Kant's critical philosophy addresses these positions, arguing that while we can only know objects as they appear to us (phenomena), the unity of the self is established by what he calls "transcendental apperception." This concept refers to the fundamental act of self-consciousness that unifies all experiences. Kant differentiates between the empirical self, known through inner sense, and the transcendental self, a necessary condition for the possibility of experience. The transcendental self is not an object of experience but rather the precondition for organizing experiences.

The paper concludes by discussing critiques from Adorno and Harman, who challenge the dualism in Kant's philosophy between the phenomenal and noumenal realms. Adorno critiques the Platonic dualism present in Kant's thought, while Harman continues this critique by proposing the dissolution of the distinction between phenomena and noumena.