The Energy Dimension of Hybrid War and the Ukraine Crisis
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DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.8111935Keywords:
Hybrid War, Energy, Ukraine CrisisAbstract
In hybrid warfare, the boundaries between military and non-military threats are blurred. When it comes to non-military means, energy resources, and energy infrastructure play a crucial role. Energy means both economic and political power. The Ukraine crisis shows that energy security is an integral part of national security, that dependence on Russia can be a strategic liability, and that interdependence between producers and consumers will not promote stability as long as the producer can remain without income and the consumer without gas. Russia uses a combination of military, semi-military, and strategic communication tools to destabilize Ukraine. It has also managed to integrate the energy factor into this strategy (through the nationalization of Ukrainian energy assets and pressure on gas prices). The main purpose of this study is to analyze the impact of energy, one of the Russian hybrid warfare methods, on the Ukrainian War. Based on the hypothesis that Russia has instrumentalized the energy factor, which is one of the hybrid warfare methods, to achieve its political, social, economic, etc. goals in Ukraine, the study examines the concepts of hybrid warfare and energy and analyses the effects of energy, one of the hybrid warfare methods, on the Ukrainian War.
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